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Marx-Shalin Exchange on the Goffman Project
The following email exchange between Dmitri Shalin and Gary T. Marx, Professor Emeritus of sociology,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, took place between August 27, 2008, and October 16, 2008. The
exchange was occasioned by Shalin’s paper “Goffman’s Biography and Interaction Order: A Study in
Biocritical Hermeneutics.” The original text is in black, Marx’s comments are marked red, and Shalin’s
response is in blue.

1.
This paper examines the interfaces between Erving Goffman’s biography and
theory. It rests on the premise that Goffman’s Behavior in Public Places can
be profitably explored in light of Goffman’s behavior in public places, and vice
versa.
Nice link! Also think a bit about what and why he withheld, he wasn’t like
some of the others of the 60s generation a decade his juniors, who, as
Berkeley teachers (and in soc. departments more broadly) let it all hang out
and tried to be your buddies etc.
Apparently Goffman found the 1960s bothersome, especially as the spirit of
the age transformed the Berkeley scene. You would think that the rule
breaking and acting out should have fascinated him, yet he seemed to be put
off by all the hustle and bustle.
You can find something of interest, intriguing yet not value it or want to be
associated with it.
The tentative conclusion I have reached after examining available biographical
accounts is that Goffman was a student of civility whose standards he flouted,
that his demeanor was sometimes intentionally demeaning, his deference
willfully deferred, and his incivility painfully obvious to those present. The
argument is made that Goffman’s infringements on the interaction order were
strategic, systematic, theoretically significant, and worthy of close study by
interactionist sociologists.
Beyond infringing, he also used it to manipulate scenes such as standing up at
his desk when he was done with you. In a way that was gentle and honorific,
I think when I was done with students I simply was more direct and maybe
that was hurtful. I would say things like, I have some stuff I have to do so I
can’t talk any further. Knowing how to send and read the cues can offer a
sense of power beyond any psychol fun and games. This also makes role

distance possible (even if sometimes only the one showing it is aware of it). –a
kind of hidden last laugh.
No, I think the standing up to get you to leave, or walking toward the door are
manipulative and indirect, at least relative to saying, “I can’t talk anymore.”
In standing up he demonstrates his awareness of the culture with respect to
what that means and of the implied status difference in which the more
dominant is more likely to initiate or end encounters. Maybe it is also the
subtlety we appreciate and take as a sign of intelligence or sophistication.
Opening and closing rituals could be unnerving for all the parties involved. I
am not sure if Goffman’s habits in this context could be called
“manipulative.” This is one of the cases when different accounts and
evaluations might shed light on the etiquette and conventions of the era.
They can also be re-assuring as comfortable rituals.
2.
Exploratory in nature, this study is designed to make the case for biocritical
hermeneutics
I know why we use such terms, but this one is the kind that non-scholars
would scoff at --is there a simpler term? Why not just biography?–
an offshoot of pragmatist sociology that focuses on the embodied social forms
and biographical underpinnings of sociological inquiry (Shalin 2007).
The term should not be too jarring for a professional ear, but it can put off
general readers. “I also use “biocritique” and “biocritical study,” but that
might not be much of an improvement.
Better I agree but still conjures up images of the body, biology and pharmacy
and bodies and draws attention away from the social. Also not sure what the
“critique”, or “critical” add. Any good scholarship will be critical as in
independent, but need not be critical as in negative, or getting at the
presumed real stuff that is hidden by self-promoters.
It uses the resources of the Intercyberlibrary (see the reference section for
URL), an online collection highlighting the works and avocational pursuits of
interactionist sociologists. The library houses The Erving Goffman Project that
features biographical materials on Goffman and promotes biographical
methods in social science.

A lot of the materials there have nothing to do with Goffman per se, although
may be broadly within areas he was concerned with. As such it is as much a
genealogy of such work much beyond Goffman or biographical methods.
The International Biography Initiative site has dozens of articles on
biographical methods in social science, some of them are first rate. Yet, most
of those are in Russian. There is much interest in biographical research in
contemporary Russian sociology. The Intercyberlibrary that houses the Erving
Goffman Project serves as an online resource for the SI community. I hope to
add there a selection of papers in English that deals with biomethods in
sociology.
3.
The problem with self-construction is that it is subject to self-sampling error
inherent in sampling by anecdote and validation through hearsay.
Is there a corrective for this? Are all self samples equally suspect, what are
the means for more and less representative samples? Also, if you qualify it and
notes its limits, does that let one off the hook?
The problem is similar in some respects (but dissimilar in other) to the
sampling concerns in sociological research. We need to reckon with the
possibility of oversampling some events and undersampling other. Things
must be rendered “accountable” before we can be “counted” – before they
count. Once we have opreationalized definitions, explained how to identify in
situ an instance of each kind, we have to figure out which events of the
designated kind are more or less prevalent. I am trying to problematize the
very process that converts a flesh and blood event into a narrative fact, for our
accounting practices are implicated in the accounts we render and the hard
numbers based on these counted accounts. When we cover biofacts, we need
to make room for singularity, but that does not preclude the search for
patterns, even if these are patterns of indeterminacy. If I preach
environmentalism but refuse to recycle my garbage, or pride myself on being
calm under pressure yet blow my top from time to time, I display a
nonidentity that must enter a biocritical account. How best to match our
behavioral indicators, verbal symbols, and emotional indexes is the question
involved in self-sampling.
I think we can also get unduly hung up on issues of sampling as
representative. At least two meanings here –first is this common, second if
uncommon is it none-the-less representative or typical of these uncommon
events when they do occur? Of course their vary distinctiveness may mean
that they stand alone. But they are no less interesting as a result.

Present in all biographical narratives, this difficulty is particularly evident in
autobiographical reconstructions whose protagonists rummage through their
own lives looking for episodes that express the author’s evolving sense of
agency. The reader is usually left uncertain as to how representative a given
sample of anecdotes is, how the incongruent strands of enselfments hang
together and whether they form a coherent whole.
4.
Rather, biocritical hermeneutics focuses on the patterns of uncertainty and
structures of indeterminacy manifest in human conduct continuously adjusted
to social pressures and revealing human agency as the inexorably stochastic
process (Shalin 1986:22). An observation by Michel Montaigne, who explored
his own life in a series of brilliant essays conceived as quasi-experiments,
illuminates this perspective human agency:
5.
Biocritical investigation starts with the premise that we gain knowledge about
ourselves and society when we examine systematically the (mis)alignment
between our words, actions, and emotions, along with the work done to
realign our word-body-action nexus.
Isn’t this deviant case analysis of a sort? Several sorts of activity you note,
but also efforts to misalign them when they would fit and to make them fit
when they shouldn’t.
It is impossible to decide without knowing the context. On many occasions
holding back one’s honest opinion and stifling one’s immediate reactions is a
good form, as is withholding information to protect third parties and going
back on one’s promise extracted under duress. Legal codes, etiquette books,
and common sense offer guidelines on when such performances turn deviant,
but it is a good idea to examine the context before we judge the matter.
Biocritical research relies on a kind of “reverse editing” that restores the
redacted enselfments and reframes the overall self-construction by crossreferencing the agent’s programmatic commitments with the available
biographical records of their actions, feelings, and words.
Great kind of like those inserts and deletions that can be brought back by a
computer command indicating when and by whom a change was made -- but
a bit more difficult!

One more ethical guideline to add to the list of principles governing biocritical
research is this: Anyone condemning a certain practice or committing publicly
to a moral principle invites scrutiny of one’s verbal and nonverbal conduct. It
is fair to explore Senator Larry Craig’s peculiar behavior in an airport bathroom
after he publicly declared his opposition to gay marriage and made derogatory
statements about gay lifestyle. This is in contrast with a situation where he
said nothing or come out in support.
By collecting biographical data and subjecting it to biocritical
Again the biocritical doesn’t set well as I noted above. Could just call
biographical analysis which involves the social, personal, cultural and historical
contexts – factors which the subject may or may not have been aware of or
treated openly.
analysis, we can better understand how affectively ambivalent and
situationally ambiguous occasions are framed into ready-to-hand accounts
which, in turn, feed back into our conduct and emotion work.
6.
Epistemologically, biocritical hermeneutics takes its cue from early Heidegger
who stressed the link between our moods and theoretical practices. “It is
precisely when we see the ‘world’ unsteady and fitfully in accordance with our
moods, that the ready-to-hand shows itself in its specific moodhood, which is
never the same from day to day. . . . Yet even the purest theoria has not left
all moods behind it. . . . Indeed from the ontological point of view we must as
a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to ‘bare moods’”
(1962:177).
Yes but there is some consistency in moodhood and that matters in contexts
where it is found (in contrast say to feelings about an overplayed popular song
that is out of fashion and even arouses negative moods now)
It would be hard indeed to build an ontology of beings and moods following
Heidegger’s suggestions. His Being and Time can be seen as a valiant
attempt, but the range of moods and emotions covered in his book is
exceedingly narrow. The same can be said about Goffman who is fixated on
embarrassment and more or less ignores other affective states.
This bold premise calls for a reexamination of the link between affect and
discursive practices. It also invites a fresh look at the hermeneutical circle
which, as Heidegger (1962:195) warned us, “is not to be reduced to the level
of vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated, [for in this] circle
is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.” I take

this to mean that, consciously or unconsciously, we insert ourselves into the
hermeneutical circle and bring our affections and deeds into a social inquiry
(Shalin 2007:220-221). Our theoretical constructs draw on the somaticaffective experience we bring to the research situation, just as the experiences
gleaned from the situation under study brings about reconstruction in our
experience.
Yes but key issue is whether there are some universals here re intuition,
archtypes etc, tricky stuff but is certainly worth thinking about, that is why
biology can be so important as one aspect of understanding society, even as it
is unpopular among many of our colleagues. I have added intuition (which no
doubt has as a major source what you suggest but may also be something
deeper across species –work on what is beautiful across cultures, the smile,
light as good etc.).
Intuition is a big word, covering all manners of things. We fall back on the
intuition when something – a deal, proposition, or self-presentation – seems
too good to be true. We eagerly search for signs to substantiate our intuition,
remaining uneasy until we succeed in rationalizing our suspicions.
Not sure about too good to be true, although that is one strand. For me
intuition is a feeling or belief that can’t be conventionally accounted for within
our logical and empirical ways of reasoning.
7.
Goffman’s methodological stance echoes this agenda. We can see that in a
talk that Goffman (2002) gave at the 1974 Pacific Sociological Association
meeting where he described participant observation as a way of “getting data .
. . by subjecting yourself, your own body and your own personality, and your
own social situation, to the set of contingencies that play upon a set of
individuals, so that you can physically and ecologically penetrate their circle of
response to their social situation, or their work situation, or their ethnic
situation, or whatever. . . . That ‘tunes your body up’ and with your ‘tuned-up
body’ and with the ecological right to be close to them (which you obtained by
one sneaky means or another), you are in a position to note their gestural,
visual, bodily response to what’s going on about them and you are empathetic
enough because you have been taking the same crap they were taking – to
sense what it is that they’re responding to” (Goffman 2002:125-126).
Great quote, you might even start with this. It also works the other way -- to
share insights about the joy re things you have taken delight in. Some of my
writing about the professional side of the profession is about the thrill felt in
succeeding, as well as the disappointment and sometimes anger, felt in

failing. Need to separate these, author and maybe his/her analysts need to
talk about kinds of affective influences beyond the negative, also is probably a
neutral category.
8.
Having being drawn into the pragmatically understood hermeneutical circle,
the biocritic will face a host of ethical challenges. Which information about the
researcher’s private life should remain private and which belongs to public
domain? What if a scholar under biocritical scrutiny made special effort – as
Erving Goffman did – to insulate his or her backstage from public scrutiny?
Also what about the former that may be more revealing rather than
concealing? – subjects who spill themselves all over the pages, as unseemly as
this can be, it seems increasingly a characteristic of our media video
culture. A nice variable across all kinds of things is how clearly offered the
backpage stuff is across fields, time periods etc. There also are good leakage
issues that Goffman wrote about. Even when the subject-author tries to
protect it, it can often be inferred from expressions etc. One of the things I
most admired about Goffman and took from him was subtly, and speaking in
code so that the hip (or the learned and smart on your wave length) will know
what you are saying -- because of double entendre cleverness, analogies,
esoteric references etc, or what was not said. In that sense he let a lot out. His
humor is a case in point. It was often biting, sarcastic and clearly was a way of
kind of showing your aces without quite doing that. He was not directly
judgmental re current events or persons and preferred to make more
categorical points about persons with privilege. That quote at the end of his
last paper about if we need warrant to speak, do so on behalf of those without
official voices applies well. While I resonated with that emotionally, empirically
it can smack of cultural colonialism, as well as the need to critically
examine allperspectives, even as we are aware of the hidden and not so
hidden hands of stratification.
I am intrigued by today’s youngsters who are eager to post personal info on
YouTube, Facebook, and similar networking vehicles. It is amazing what one
can find posted on the web about the dates, colleagues, bosses. . . . The
standards are evolving rapidly in this area, as the etiquette books are
rewritten and the meaning of selfhood and privacy continues to evolve. I
appreciate your insights into Goffman’s manners and the meaning encoded in
his actions. It would be hard for me to latch onto some of that stuff and
understand its socio-cultural context.
9.

“Goffman was very secretive about his personal life,” Fine, Manning, and
Smith (2000:x) remind us in their extensive review of Goffman’s
work. “[T]he executor of Goffman’s estate, abiding by his wishes, has closed
his personal records to those who would investigate his life,” confirms Jaworski
(2000:299). Yves Winkin, a sociologist who made a concerted effort to study
Goffman’s biography, corroborates this point: “In Goffman’s case, it was clear
that his privacy was jealously guarded. He never gave interviews to the
media, he never allowed his publishers to release pictures of him and he never
appeared on television. In November 1983, when I approached Gillian
Sankoff, his widow and literary executor, I was politely acknowledged but was
given no overt help (such as access to the archives). . . . As Gillian Sankoff
explained to me, Goffman wanted to keep his life totally separate from his
work” (Winkin 1999:19-20). But can a scholar really keep one’s life
completely separate from one’s work?
That contrast is really interesting given how much he generalized from his own
personal experiences, perceptions and sense of things as a bedrock method –
at least when starting. It also contrasts with the 60s communal, share it ethos
and the role of reciprocity in human solidarity and the tilt toward authenticity.
It also is a status differentiating thing.
This really needs explaining! There is (or should be) a literature on wills,
instructions to executors, things to be opened only upon death. A variety of
reasons for posthumous offerings or withholdings and that needs to be
connected to degree of revelation etc. during the person’s life. Beyond
strategic reasons for holding back, there may also be effort to create some
mystery, playfulness in teasing an audience in hinting or withholding while
alive, a type of manipulation known to advertisers, but that wouldn’t hold for
after death. Holding back is also a form of power (the sociology of information
and the secret are relevant here ala Simmel) as it touches such things) but
then it only works if you let it slip sometimes so others know there is a
secret. It may also speak to his seriousness about being what he called a
“student” in which we have this glorious trek to knowledge and what matters
is the project not the person.
I am thinking how Simmel’s interest in secrecy might have implicated his own
life, his very personal need for secrecy. That is the issue implicating
biocritique. One has to consider the danger of reductionism here, but also be
aware of a potential for serious exploration. It is hard to believe that Simmel
theorized secrecy without drawing on his own experience. He talks about the
situations where “the guilty one alone knows the fault,” about “a fault against
the other of which both are conscious,” “a considerateness, a delicacy, a secret
wish to make up for it, a yieldingness and selflessness, none of which would

ever occur to him had he a completely untroubled conscience.” These
observations come from a man maintaining vigorous social intercourse,
managing a wife and a mistress, having a child that would be raised by both,
and so much more. An urbane man par excellence, Simmel traveled in many
circles and fully enjoyed what the partially overlapping networks, ample
financial resources, and his celebrity status had to offer.
Also I don’t know, but imagine some of documents from a will or estate are
public and something might be learned there, but this as you note, gets
delicate even it is legal to rummage around. I think a lot about the interplay
of public and private and different meanings of these. Part of it is being able
to see and morally and mentally order the public in the private and the
reverse.
What do you think he meant in dedicating one of his books to Radcliffe-Brown
who he almost met? That in a sense is personal, but in a peculiar way. What
doesn’t happen to us is rarely made much of. Why does he inject himself
here? Why not in other places?
Yet, I was unable so far to track the statement he made on the subject. I
suspect that Goffman saw a kindred spirit in Radcliff-Brown, a fellow
ethnographer, a master craftsman, even though the kind of ethnography each
man did could not be more different.
In the past, Gillian turned down requests for interviews (I understand that her
daughter is equally uninterested and have no idea what the situation with his
son is). I would not want to bother her with my inquiries. As for the reasons
behind Goffman’s decision to seal his archives, I wish I knew more
details. Most published info appears to be second-hand; the gist of it is that
Erving wanted to separate his life and work. The exact wording of his will,
formal or informal, is important.
The case was made to me on occasion by those who knew Goffman personally
that his work stands or falls on its own, that in-depth knowledge of his
personal life cannot help us build on Goffman’s insights and carry on his
sociological tradition. Moreover, interest in the scholar’s personal life risks
turning prurient.
This ain’t necessarily bad, if some broader points lie there, it may be a
necessary cost, also gives realism to us as humans and can make more
interesting to read. The issue is prurience for its own sake does not belong in
this type of work.

I think so too, but many enough disagree. I hope that once the scholarly
dimension of the Goffman project becomes clear, more people agree to share
memories or offer comments/corrections. The thing I particularly value in
your comments is that they help me understand Erving’s humanity –
something I want to explore and celebrate – without glossing over the rough
edges of his personality, as well as of his time and place.
10.
In the same spirit, P.S. Strong lists several lessons Goffman bequeathed to us,
one of which bears on the propriety of treating the researcher’s life as a
resource: “[Y]ou can treat your own life as data. Each one of us is a natural
control group; if our splendidly universal theories don’t even apply to our own
lives, there must be something wrong with them. . . . To treat one’s entire life
as data is at one and the same time to dedicate oneself entirely to the
discipline; to relentlessly combat ‘that touching tendency to keep a part of the
world safe from sociology’ and to treat the whole life, including sociology, its
works and homilies, as a resource for intellectual exploration” (Strong
2000:42, 41).
Yes but depends on the kind of issue or question one is concerned with,
dangers of over-generalizing. Also I recall his wonderful remark about how
“it’s all data.” That applies to what is offered apart from its logical, empirical or
moral adequacy but also to that which is not revealed. Such data more clearly
takes on meaning when contrasted to related settings where it is revealed by
others. Is hard to see non-events however. But an aspect of imagination is
identifying them. Imputing motives for withholding is also even harder absent
a confession or an informer.
Biocritical hermeneutics raises the issue of autobiocritique. Those interested
in other peoples’ archives ought to be ready to open up their own. I am
troubled by the fact that the founder of “archeology of knowledge” destroyed
his archives before his death, and the great explorer of “society’s backstage”
refused to lift the curtain on his private existence. We own our archives and
can dispose of them as we see fit, but we do not own our reputations and have
no right to other people’s opinions about ourselves.
11.
As co-director of the International Biography Initiative (see the reference
section for URL), I grapple with such issues when I prepare for publication
interviews recorded over the course of years with Russian social scientists and
intellectuals. Even when respondents gave every indication that their

interviews or memoirs should enter the public domain, the question persists
whether frank opinions and intimate details that surface in their narratives
should be kept away from the public.
Yes, but need to stay on guard against being manipulated or ask it is for a
good cause?
I thought I would find clear guidelines articulated by historians, biographers,
and archivists on how best to handle private information but discovered that
this was not at all the case. Much needs to be done to clarify this murky
domain. Recently, I have learned (from Carolyn Ellis and Kathy Charmaz in
particular) about the lively debate on this subject among ethnographers. The
issues of autoethnography and co-constructed narratives are of particular
interest in this respect.
Those compiling an autobiography confront a similar set of narrative problems
and ethical dilemmas. Which biographical materials are to be redacted, how
closely the edited truth must resemble messy realities, when the account
offered to the public becomes self-serving, what is the proper balance of tact
and frankness, of an overarching narrative unity and jarring selfrevelations? Interviews and memoirs posted on the International Biography
Initiative site are highly illuminating in this respect. They show that Russian
scholars seeking to reconcile their perestroika selves with their earlier soviet
incarnations sometime willfully omit key events that cast their past identities
and subsequent metamorphoses in more ambiguous light (Shalin 2006,
2008).
Good acknowledge the tensions; have you read The File by Ash-Garner, very
relevant for these issues! The film The Lives of Others is relevant here as well.
Have not read “The File” but saw the movie ‘Lives of Others” – a powerful
statement indeed. I found it to be more effective as a political testimony than
artwork. Conversations with Russian sociologists and public intellectuals I
have been conducting over the course of years address many of the issues
raised in the movie.
12.
Ives Winkin (1999:20) asks, “[D]o I have the right to invade his [Goffman’s]
privacy?” The answer is “yes,” provided the researcher is “well-intentioned as
good literary standards permit. There should be no stature crafting, but
equally there should be no unnecessary unwrapping either”

I wrote to Winkin asking about his work and he did not respond. How easy is
it to determine what is necessary and unnecessary? A lot is contextual and
depends on what is at stake. The privacy of leaders seems of a different order
than of those not in the public eye.
I wrote to Winkin about the Goffman project – twice. He did not reply. It is
possible that my messages did not reach him, but it is unlikely.
That does not sound like much of an advice (how much unwrapping is too
much?) for those wading through the muddy waters of biocritique. Still, we
should heed the common sense appeal to tact. Be clear about your inquiry’s
goal, highlight alternative interpretations, explore the potential sources of
bias, consider the best and worst case scenarios,
And also acknowledge the enduring tensions and tradeoffs.
do as little harm as possible to the third parties, pay close attention to the
historical circumstances and the ethical standards of the time – such are
ethical guideposts I propose to follow in this biocritical inquiry. We also need
to bear in mind that biocritical accounts may reveal as much about the biocritic
as about the object of biocritical investigation.
13.
A good example is Robert Erwin who provides this brief but telling account of
his encounters with Goffman:
I base my opinion of Goffman’s personality on three conversations I had
with him as a publisher between 1967 and 1979, on a couple of casual social
encounters, and on stories told me by two friends and a person who dealt with
him on academic business.
A number of people who knew him in person referred to him as sour and
sardonic, although a minority objected to those labels. The word I would use
to characterize his personality is eerie.
During a year he spent at the Harvard Center for International Affairs,
where I was then Editor of Publications, Goffman enrolled a child at the
Cambridge school which one of my daughters was attending.
One sunny Saturday at a fund-raising fair at the school I discovered that
the jazz quartet playing outside the Science Building included Edmond Hall,
the superb Dixieland clarinetist. Hall was old and down on his luck by the look
of him, but he still had fasts fingers and a mahogany tone.
Goffman came ambling along while I was listening. As we carried on
small talk about the fair, the school, and our offspring, I nodded and beamed
at the music, making no secret of my exultation and veneration. The more

enthusiasm I showed, the more Goffman looked at me with dread, and in a
little while he left like a miner escaping from a tunnel that may collapse at any
minute.
Maybe I was ingenuous. Maybe he was tone deaf. Yet I could not help
but think of the Wicked Witch in the Wizard of Oz, the one who would melt if
you splashed water at her. Dread is not too strong a word for what I felt in
him. He seemed to fear that to be splattered with joy would be lethal. (Erwin
2000:94)
Good writing, I knew Bob in Cambridge and found him delightful. Yet I’d be
careful about basing too much on such superficial data. Re that one instant, a
lot of other things might have been on his mind that he was pulled by, rather
than being pushed by the music.
He worked very hard and was serious about learning and I think about
advancing his career (I don’t know how well he lived with the higher income
he had from several sources (re his life style -- did he live beyond the usual
faculty – since he clearly could of? I sensed a kind of social tenseness in him,
not quite a quivering voice but close to it, he was deliberate, a good listener in
the sense of using what you said/did for his own sardonic comments rather
than as a deep response to what you had said directed to you and your
needs. Phrasing in the form of “people like you” “people of that ilk” come to
mind, not sure if he said “like us” but he clearly included himself in some of
the stigmatized categories.
I agree that we need to use caution passing judgments on such episodes
without knowing the entire context. Erwin’s immersion into the music scene
might have desensitized him to Goffman’s emotional needs, situational
concerns. Wish I had more than one account of this episode.
14.
As the work on the Erving Goffman Project lumbers along, it might be helpful
to distinguish between (1) hearsay – tales about the person floating around
without clear attribution; (2) anecdotes – stories traced to a particular source
but not necessarily witnessed by the narrator; (3) episodes – single events
witnessed by a narrator who did not play a major part in the encounter;
(4)encounters – an interaction in which the narrator engaged in a focused
interchange with the person in question; (5) transactions – a series of direct
and indirect encounters stretching over a course of time and hinting at a
pattern; (6) reputations – opinions about the person’s agency formed by
specific narrators on the basis of personal observations, second hand
accounts, and partial record; (7) evaluations – considered biocritical
judgments about an embodied historical agent based on the personal

accounts, institutional records, and other traces that the agent or a group of
agents left behind. We might also need a term like biographical
repertories to describe a range of biographical blueprints that gain currency
in a historical group, strata, society, or era. The notion of “biographem”
deployed by Winkin (1999) suggests additional lines for biocritical
investigation. A specific tale may not fall squarely into either category,
spanning several framing models at once, but the above schema might help
assess its general thrust.
Great set of concepts, you should elaborate on these in your paper, -- expand
with examples. Do you know my essay on means of finding dirty data,
(http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/dirty.html). I think a lot about these things,
but more in trying to figure out what is truth of various kinds, the nature of
knowledge, how does the positivist’s knowledge connect to other kinds of
knowing etc. I do this pretty seat of the pants not from much knowledge (yet)
of the deeper literatures. I will try to connect your comments here to a
chapter on types of personal data for my surveillance project.
Will supply examples in time and see how much testimony falls into each
category.
The would-be contributors to the Erving Goffman Project who witnessed Erving
personally and have a tale to share can shed light on his physical appearance
(e.g., estimates of Erving’s heights range between 5.2 and 5.6), his demeanor
(e.g., his eagerness to reveal the other’s and conceal his own backstage),
manner of dress (e.g., some remember him as a dapper, deliberate dresser
while others recall him being casual about his clothes), as well as specific
deeds that show the widest possible range of his enselfments (e.g., is the
story about Goffman’s pointing to the inferiority of female grad student
apocryphal?).
I am sure he was under 5.6 since he seemed short to me but he was
graceful. I don’t recall ever seeing him in a tie but he was not a slob
either. He did indicate to me that some concessions had to be made –I think
he said he didn’t much like to shave but he did on those occasions requiring it,
also re being a drop-out California fun seeker in the scenes John Irwin wrote
about, Goffman said that was great but you couldn’t do it forever, not after
age 30 anyway. I think the point here wasn’t about needing a real job, but
more that you would look silly. Well if we know about social construction etc.,
why should the well-put-together smart person care what it looks like to
others, why not be subversive, not to shock but to be “true” to yourself? So
that comment perhaps suggests his commitment to the middle class values he
could also mock so well. He seemed to be saying that even role distance had

to be within appropriate bounds/bonds or else it didn’t work. Knowing how to
read opaque social situations is clearly an interpretive gift and skill for
humans.
15.
As Dean MacCannell put it, “Goffman was both friendly, modest, and
considerate – and he could be mean as hell” (MacCannell 2007).
I never saw any personal meanness. I did a few times sense his impatience
and I did not appreciate the almost total lack of comments on my paper and
the B plus grade as I recall, even though he cited in his Stigma and I think I
got an A on his final. I think he gave me a B+ for the class and that seemed
wrong, but it never occurred to me to ask why or to argue.
I hope to write about Goffman and his students some days. Would be
interesting to learn your impressions about Goffman the lecturer. I have
collected some interesting and inconsistent testimonies on that score.
He was the most interesting teacher I have ever had. He taught by his content
and by his style.
16.
People who knew Goffman well have sought to reconcile such contradictory
strands in Goffman’s enselfments and explain their admiration for the
man. Says John Irwin, “Even though Erving could be a pain in the ass and
sometimes cruel, my wife and I loved him because he was so smart,
fascinating, entertaining, and occasionally kind” (Irwin, 2007). Gary Marx
invokes the image of “at least two Goffmans. One was wise, warm, and of
good humor, eager to impart knowledge via morality tales and specific advice
and make the student feel like he or she was within the chosen circle of person
in the know. . . . The other Goffman was controlled, insensitive, and
indifferent and made sure the student knew his place. Most of the ‘Tales of
Goffman’ are negative. In many of his dealings with others he did not reflect
the sensitivity and concern for the underdog shown in his early written work”
(Marx 2000:67). John Lofland captures “dialectical contradictions” in
Goffman’s presentation of self especially well:
He was a severe formal theorist yet a descriptive ethnographer; a reclusive
scholar yet an adroit administrator and a rapier-witted party-goer; cynical yet
sincere; an intellectual giant yet skeptical about his achievements; openly
crass in promoting his self-interest yet rejecting broad and public selfpromotion; brilliant at ferreting out social bluffs yet less than adept at bluffing;

religious about scholarship yet cynical about social enterprises. Most certainly
he stripped away polite fictions in print and in person, yet also in print and in
person had the deepest and most profound appreciation of the importance of
‘tact, graciousness, and compassion” (Lofland 2000:176).
This part I think was central and the dialects from his personal marginality and
novelists/human’s ability to imagine helped with his insights. I don’t know
about his adroit administrator part, he seemed to avoid committees etc by
being difficult.
17.
How could a scholar speaking so eloquently about the cruel way society
stigmatizes its members tell a female student that “he did not think women
should be in graduate school” or pointedly use derogatory terms like “gimps”
when “there was a badly crippled woman in the class” (Marx 2000:67). Notice
that it was the same Goffman who published pioneering studies
like Stigma (1963), “The Arrangements between the Sexes” (1977),
and Gender Advertisements (1979). It is hard to think Goffman was unaware
of how his speech acts must have affected the people he stigmatized. Then,
what was the pedagogical meaning of his harangues?
Maybe he couldn’t so easily always control them, there needn’t always be a
method behind the madness.
Or consider a report about Goffman passing through a hotel lobby at a
sociology convention and casually remarking to a group of friends: “’If I can’t
find anybody more important to talk with, I’ll come back and talk with you’. A
jaunty terrorist with a diffident voice reminding us that in this world’s bag fullto-bursting with banal sentiment,”
This could also be a sign of respect – you mattered enough to be able to share
in his cleverness and honesty to confront sacred animals. We all know that
opportunistic climbing sentiment, even as it gets suppressed. I would take it
in an appreciative way if he said that to me. The issue is would he have said it
to Merton or Blumer? I bet not, so in saying it he is acknowledging that we in
a sense can be trusted because we are at or below him and he can be honest
with us. This may hurt because it says we are lower, but also may flatter
because it says he is honest and we know what he is expressing and he knows
that we know.
observes Bennett Berger (2000:279), “anybody who says something cruel and
true can’t be all bad.”

Yet these 2 are linked in delicate ways and as he knew there are times when it
is better to be false and kind.
The issues of power are powerfully implicated in Erving’s conduct, as they are
in his theories, although he does not conceptualize them explicitly.
18.
Here is one more example illuminating the persistent self-referentiality in
Goffman’s conduct. It comes from Goffman’s “lecture about lecture” delivered
at the University of Michigan in 1976 where he mocked a typical lecturer who
“in exchange for this song and dance, this stage-limited performance of
approachability, this illusion of personal access . . . gets honor, attention,
applause and a fee. For which I thank you” (Goffman 1983c:194).
I don’t get this one, once in awhile there is a big gap and it is a ritual and
empty. But the best academic presentations (especially in a small group, or if
a large one, involving those deeply knowledgeable or at least interested), it
needn’t be an illusion since there are sincere and helpful exchanges which can
go on, there is personal access re future meetings, advice, footnotes etc. and
the honor is very modest. Perhaps he exaggerates to make the point about
how there is a ritual presentational quality to it but there is so much more (or
can be). So in a way this is a cheap shot kind of remark and his own work
ethos undercuts it. Can the same be said for publishing an article?
Just about any interaction can be viewed from the vantage point of impression
management, just about every situation can morph into a staged performance
requiring a dramaturgical analysis. This applies to lectures and lecturing. The
important thing is that Erving perceived himself under those circumstances as
engaged in a highly stylized, staged self-presentation.
19.
Also, there is probably a sampling bias in all memoir literature that tends to
focus on the spectacular, the offbeat, and the negative and underreport the
routine, the mundane, and the benign. Here is a recollection by David
Dickens, 2008) that shows Goffman’s different sides:
During my last year of graduate school, in 1977 or 1978, I presented a paper
on phenomenological sociology at a conference in Boston. The session was
chaired by Larry Wieder, a prominent ethnomethodologist. Once the
presentations concluded, a small unassuming man walked up to me, shook my
hand and told me “I really enjoyed your paper. It was very clear.” I thanked
him and he then turned toward Larry, whom he seemed to know, and said

“Larry, I didn’t understand a word you said.” Wieder, being the kind fellow that
he was, simply chuckled and said, “Well, Erving, I’m sorry to hear that.” I still
had no idea who the stranger was but, as he turned and walked away, Larry
looked at me and said, “you should be very proud, that was Erving Goffman.”
But this goes in the right direction re the weak and the strong, unlike some of
his other stuff. In those early years most of the students I knew had trouble
making sense of ethno-methodology, even when they were sympathetic to
symbolic interaction.
This story also fits with his not wearing a name tag at professional meetings.
His failure to introduce himself in the story above could be seen as humility
and wanting to put the emphasis on the student’s paper or as arrogance, just
assuming that everyone would know who he was and people as famous as
himself had no need to introduce themselves.
I agree. Wish I had more episodes of this kind to see how they are distributed
in Erving’s self-production.
20.
As this example shows, Goffman could be supportive and dismissive at the
same time. And he clearly showed the capacity for growth, both intellectually
and personally. Goffman might have been skeptical about women’s work in
graduate school at the early stages of his career but later wrote papers on
gender discrimination and institutional reflexivity, which must have been
prompted in part by his reflections on his own role as a professor in the
academe dominated by males. He castigated mental institutions for the
abusive treatment they gave their charges, following which he wrote a
powerful account of what it is like to live with a disturbed person prone to
violating the interaction order. He pretty much ignored the role of the body in
his early writings, notably in The Presentation of Self, then spoke eloquently
about the pervasive effect that our bodily limitations and affective
disturbances have on our conduct. We might take these metamorphoses as a
warning against the tendency to cherry pick evidence that accords with certain
preconceptions and gloss over human agency’s inchoate properties. Human
agency is a stochastic phenomena marked by indeterminacy and
contradiction.
Yes but also by lots of consistency and predictability, especially over groups
and aggregates, need to contextualize to note where have more or less of this,
one of my areas is the sociology of surprise but that is partly possible because
there is so much that isn’t a surprise.

Yes, there is a dialectics of continuity and discontinuity. The question is what
we designate as a figure here and what relegate to the background.
Still, when I hear about the “hazing” to which Goffman subjected those close
to him (Lofland 2000:167; Scheff 2006:11), I cannot help thinking that such
episodes are too numerous to ignore, especially when they concern a studentteacher relationship. When we profess we impart knowledge not only via
discourse but also viscerally, through our embodied actions which provide a
somatic-affective backdrop against which our professed theoretical
commitments loom larger or smaller. That applies not only to Erving Goffman
whose deeds and theories reveal a certain thematic (dis)continuity, but to all
of us who aspire to profess and who, often in spite of ourselves, serve as vital
links in the long semiotic chains of history. Goffman’s abiding commitment to
scholarship, seriousness of his intellectual pursuits, willingness to work closely
with aspiring scholars are of signal importance
There was not a lot of this that I saw. He had very few PhD students, what
does that say? A great quote about this in the book Genius that I will track
down and send you about the physicist Richard Feynman’s lack of students.
This may be meaningful. I would like to compile a list of Goffman’s grad
students and see if there is any pattern.
but so are the occasions where he exhibited a remarkable lack of emotional
intelligence as evidenced by the tears to which he reduced his charges and
humiliations he caused to those close to him.
21.
Goffman’s relationships with his students deserve a special attention. In many
cases, it seems, these relationships were marred by strain and ill-feelings. All
teacher-apprentice bonds have the potential to be fragile on account of the
inevitable status disparity, signal crossing, only partially fulfilled
promises. Still, the number of Goffman’s students regaling their ambivalence
and misgivings about the master seems unusually high.
But the number writing about him relative to others is also high. The issue is
within those who comment does he get a higher proportion of such stories?
That is one of the tasks to be undertaken.
22.

Tom Scheff, who notes that “as teacher and mentor, Goffman was generous
and helpful,” tells about his disappointment when he travelled some distance
to consult Goffman on his project only to be dismissed in a rather summary
fashion – “he cut me off abruptly after hearing only a few minutes of my
observation and confusion” (Scheff 2006:8-13). Joel Best (2007) recalls how
he went to Goffman’s office to inquire about the project he tried to model on
his teacher’s writing “in a sense that it had examples from fiction, newspaper
articles, and so on . . . and he gave me a B+ on the paper. He told me, ‘It is
really hard to do that kind of thing well.’ And that was about all the advice I
ever got from him.” John Irwin (2007) recounts a similar story about a paper
he turned over to Goffman who” coldly informed me that he would not work
with me on a PhD. . . . I didn’t have much contact with Goffman for the next
two years. When I put together a group of professors to serve as my orals’
committee, which had to pass on my mastery of several chosen areas of
sociology before I could go on to my last task, the dissertation, I purposely left
him off because I heard he gave one of the other graduate students I knew a
lot of trouble during his orals.”
I am pretty sure this was me, I remember talking a lot to John (who came a
few years after I did) about my graduate experiences. I don’t recall Goffman
giving me a lot of trouble, but I do recall he took it all very seriously and
pushed me. It took the committee a long time to decide my case. I was
outside nervously waiting. S.M. Lipset came out and said something like,
“congratulations you passed with distinction.” Lipset said it took awhile
because they were trying to decide whether I had passed with distinction. I
assume since Lipset was my main advisor then, having given me my ma data
on Father Coughlin and Neil Smelser later praised that Goffman was less
enthusiastic, but I don’t know. I then took off for a year of round the world
travel and received an NIMH grant with him as my sponsor for the following
year. But I let that go because of an offer that seemed much more appealing
(this involved a full time job and a study more related to social issues). I didn’t
see him much the next year, but we did meet at least once. The next year he
was at Harvard for the year and then he moved to Penn.
One thing I would dearly like to do in the Goffman project is to track the same
event(s) as they are reflected in different accounts. The Goffman project is
designed in part to examine how real time events grow into narrative facts and
how biographical narratives deploy and transcend the conventions of the
time. Fleeting impressions, second-hand accounts, and comments on other
people’s comments are equally valuable in this respect, for they can be crossreferenced and checked against each other.
23.

Recalling “the fight with Goffman” that he and Sacks carried on and that some
might have mistaken for the oedipal urge to slay one’s intellectual father,
Schegloff observes that the animus was coming from the other end: “It was
Sacks, actually, who remarked once that we nowadays think of Oedipus story
as a story about patricide, but that it was in the first instance, of course, a
case of intended infanticide . . . it was his father who first left Oedipus to
die, and not the other way around” (Schegloff 1988:91). This story had a
characteristic twist. When asked if Sacks was his student, Goffman once
allegedly answered: “‘What do you mean; I was his student!’” (Schegloff
1992:xxiii). This episode is indicative of Goffman’s ability to shift shapes
without the willingness to explain himself, to connect his past and present
enselfments and square off with the ethical implications of his deeds. Goffman
will not be contained; whatever frame he was about to impose on the situation
and himself, he would find the way to undercut it at one point or another.
In this setting where he has the power there is also an aspect of playing,
teasing, hiding. But that won’t be contained thing is also an attribute of those
we find “interesting” or “a character” or a “live wire” could also be for someone
who is easily bored because he is so smart and insightful and needs to play
and confound to keep himself amused, as well as perhaps sometimes as a
pedagogical tool. I recall sometime connecting him to the problems of those
who are so much smarter or quicker and more insightful than others, there is
a kind of impatience with the slow and less wise that can re responded too
with role distancing by the superior party and with humor and also by
challenging them by doing something not expected.
The quick-witted might be annoying to those around. Perhaps Goffman used
to single out such students and treat them differently. He was a smart aleck
himself, according to Hughes. There was not much interaction between
Hughes and Goffman after the latter’s defense. Goffman avoided citing his
teachers. Only later on in life Goffman acknowledged his teacher’s influence in
a personal letter (see Jaworski’s article on the subject posted in the
Intercyberlibrary).
24.
Perhaps the boldest interpretation of Goffman’s conduct comes from Dean
MacCannell who reads Goffman’s life as a deliberate effort to combat bad faith
that Sartre decried in his existentialist philosophy:
Not sure how you fight bad faith by asserting it – unless it is to offer examples
that encourage self-reflection and bring insight by shattering the taken-forgranted. His analysis and writing can be seen partly as pleas for authenticity

and honesty and as stressing the importance of respecting the dignity of the
person and not exploiting others or engaging in anti-community actions for
self-serving ends. Somewhere he wrote that the first norm was to be what you
appear to be (or perhaps he put it more softly as a universal expectation). A
lot of his work dealt with deviations from this and responses to it. His brilliant
insights and vision saw more often than most persons the gap between verbal
and other presentations and the “reality” within back stage scenes and
personal masks. Given what we know of power, stratification and culture this
was more likely to show up the more privileged and hence is a blow for the
good guys. His insights into gender images is the best example, but Stigma
has many as well.
But I don’t see how some of the “tales of Goffman” re his behavior were
fighting this good fight.
How does one combat it rather than encouraging it by behaving badly or
counter to the norms? To be honest and direct and not hide perhaps counters
it, but some of his other behaviors seem to involve bad faith. You could count
up all the behavioral examples you have found and categorize those and see
where they fit re the above and other categories.
I agree – fighting bad faith with bad faith may perpetuate bad faith rather
than expose and undercut it. At the same time, I see why this strategy has
been deployed by agents in particular historical circumstances.
If we list the various claims (both substantiated and the other kind) that have
been made against Goffman – cynical, ironical, duplicitous, deceptive,
unserious, nonresponsive – we find they are also the key terms in Sartre’s
analysis of ‘bad faith’. It seems that Goffman took Sartre so much to heart
that he assembled a persona for himself exactly on the model of ‘Sartrean bad
faith’, perhaps in the belief that a double negative makes a positive, that is, if
he could only mock up bad faith maybe he, at least, could escape the
determinism he describes so well. Certainly there is evidence in his
comportment that Goffman was more concerned than anyone else about the
implications of his theory (MacCannell, 2000:13).
25.
Goffman’s research agenda could have been influenced by his struggle to
assert his dignity, move up in the social hierarchy, overcome the stigmatizing
experience of his childhood and youth (consider in this context his remark to
Dell Hymes). Hence, his preoccupation with appearances, stigmatization, and
passing persisting throughout his intellectual career, as well as the impostor

complex ingrained in his dramaturgical preoccupation with the con artists’
craft.
Really are at least two pieces here. First as a kind of living testimony to
injustice and unfairness and pretense and second simply as a strategy to get
ahead by fitting into showing role-nearness rather than distance. Don’t stand
out, to get along go along, don’t rock the boat.
I paid close attention to Goffman’s first major article, the one on the symbols
of class status. I feel it illuminates his early interest in climbing and passing
that can be connected with his biography, even though he preferred not to
tackle head-on the issues of class in his subsequent works.
None of these explanations is self-evident, neither excludes the others, yet
they all point to a linkage between Goffman’s life and work.
26.
The impression that Kohn and his colleagues at the Institute of Mental Health
formed at the time was that this separation had to do with marital
difficulties. Kohn is careful to problematize his conclusions, pointing out that
his information came to him second-hand: “We all assumed this [the fact that
his wife did not at first join Goffman at Berkeley] had to do with the strain in
their marriage. We might have learned this from people who knew both of
them better. But I knew of nothing [in particular]. She did not have a
job. My assumption might have been informed by those who knew the
situation.”
This is ok as a broad observation on the irony etc., but the timing and
circumstances seem off. The de-institutionalization movement I think came
only later. Also as a rich person she would likely have been in private
institutions and able to come and go at will unlike those turned out onto the
streets from public hospitals a bit later
That is a worthy resource and I should probably look into it. If you know how
to go about it or how to contract Charlie Glock, please let me know. Goffman’
interest in mental institutions interfaces with his wife’s mental issues and
experiences with psychiatry. That mush seems clear. The exact nature of this
interface needs to be researched.
27.
The impression management technique focuses on the qualities amenable to

semiotic control, susceptible to simulation and dissimulation.
Great ambiguous terms. I have written on this and would be interested in how
you approach it. This ties to the ambiguity of language and the fact that while
just about everything is a social construction and partial, that doesn’t mean it
is all fake or fake in the same ways when it is and that of course has social
causes and consequences.
I discuss the relationship between simulation and dissimulation in my ST
article “Signing in the Flesh” (it is posted in the Intercyberlibrary). My
position is that every act of simulation involves dissimulation and vice versa. I
have proposed the notion of “dissimulacrum” to complement the more familiar
“simulacrum.” The thrust of this discussion is directed against the
postmodernist contention that we can never get a hold of “presence,” that all
we can witness is “absence.” My suggestion was that postmodernist gloss
over the pesky corporealites and affective disturbances driving their
imagination.
Semiotic resources of the body are vast indeed, but they are not limitless. Not
all body indicia can be stage-managed. You cannot sit at the piano for an
improvisation, take a bar exam on the fly, stand your ground in a dog fight, or
argue gracefully in a high-stake debate – unless you have the right stuff, the
hard-acquired habitus. The ceremonial skills we deploy at a wedding will not
get us far in the operating room or on a dance floor. Talking the talk is one
thing, walking the walk is another, and rocking the rock is something else
altogether. You can fake an orgasm, but it is hard to simulate a hard-on, or
dissimulate it, for that matter. Much of our life is embodied, substantive, and
instrumental in a way that anonymous encounters in the elevator or chance
meetings on the streets are not.
28.
Goffman’s works are replete with the observations that presuppose Goffman’s
exposure to the relevant experience or vouch for his willingness to trust his
contemporaries to supply the meaning of the reported activity. However, the
exact source of Goffman’s knowledge about the “real thing” and the “faked
one” and the empirical indicators thereof are rarely spelled out.
This gets to my opening comment, the assumption of a shared culture and set
of experiences, but it also makes me wonder why persons are drawn to
Goffman (or what separates those who are from those who aren’t). A
worthwhile paper lies in analyzing Goffman’s legacy through those he
influenced. In my book on surveillance which I will send some of, I frame it

around a number of his information control concerns updated to the cyberage.
Why am I drawn to Goffman’s life and work? There must be reasons for that,
implicating my own embodied existence. I remember discovering Goffman in
my college years, reading the Presentation of Self, writing a paper on Russian
culture inspired in part by Goffman’s ideas. With its tradition of Potemkin
portable villages, USSR seemed like a perfect terrain for dramaturgical
analysis. I can list several possible connections between Goffman’s theories
and my own biography: (a) Goffman’s parents emigrated from Russia, and so
did I; (b) Goffman is given to mocking and sarcasm common in Russian
intellectuals, a pattern I interpret as a response to an abusive environment
with which I am all too familiar; (c) the ambivalent tales regaled by Goffman’s
students resonate with my own experience; (d) I can identify with Goffman’s
efforts to transcend the formative conditions of his age, to shed the habits
informed by the narrow perspective of the era. Other parallels can be drawn
here, no doubt. The list is not exhaustive, nor can it be exhausted in
principle. Anything I can say about the reasons and motives driving my
inquiry is problematic. (Isn’t it why you cannot fully psychoanalyze
yourself?). The process is inevitably open-ended, yielding new insights when
performed by different biocritics. The very process of inventing the terms and
frames for autobiocritique is continuous with social transformation.
29.
Displaying requisite selves, protecting other people’s faces, maintaining proper
affect, remedying situational infractions – there is hardly an interaction ritual
that Goffman would not violate when the opportunity presented itself. This is
not to say that the interaction order is a figment of our imagination, only that
it is indefinitely flexible and that its power to constrain is perennially
problematic. It is less of a ceremony than a semi-chaotic order that keeps
emerging in feats and starts without ever solidifying into a reality sui generis.
Yes but… seems too strong for me, depends on type and context --some are
wide open, others highly contained and some in between. People vary in their
styles apart from context. We sometimes say there is a bad fit etc or you are
just right for that task, implying the perfect merge. Studying collective
behavior earlier in my career helped with these issues, (e.g., especially the
first chapter of a collective behavior book -http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/cbchap1.html
Yes, the degrees of orderliness vary from one social domain to another, but
there is hardly a realm where a measure of indeterminacy and an element of
ad hocing are present.

Goffman’s theory of interaction order glosses over the formal and
explicit issues of power which inform much of our interactive strategies.
But a lot is there by indirection.
The insights Goffman has to offer are personal; they are sifted through the
affective filter that informs his ethnographic sensibilities and colors his
conceptual innovations. While such insights may be biased and thus need to
be corrected, they often have a visceral truth to them that owes much to
Goffman’s willingness to insert himself into the hermeneutical circle and allow
his affective compass to guide his inquiry.
30.
But this is hidden. There is rarely an “I” in his work, that could be another
easy to do computer project ala the methods used by those who analyze
Shakespeare word patterns.
Goffman’s theories elide certain emotions in part because he had troubles
experiencing particular affective states. If his formulations sometimes evince
the uneasiness about the bodily dimension of social interaction, it is in part
because he felt ambivalent about his own corporeal dimensions and embodied
qualities.
Don’t we all? This is partly why people resonate so with some of his work,
even those who don’t know from sociology. I also think his imaginative
empathy suggests undercuts the suggestion that he had affective issues. I
would keep observable behavioral expressions distinct from what the actor
may experience.
True, but our ambivalence manifests itself in a drastically different
manner. Some people maintain stoic impenetrability, others get hot under the
color, still others dissimulate.
As several commentators point out, Goffman’s take on stigmatized agency
implicated his own embodied being. A master of ceremony, Goffman felt more
comfortable communicating the niceties of social etiquette and expressive
behavior than articulating the substantive, exchange-based transactions in
which social life is grounded and which serve as a check on our expressive
claims.
For example consider…

Conartistry can get us only that far. The expressive costume we don must
meet the requirements of the place but it also must fit our biosocial physic,
skills, qualifications.
31.
The Durkheimean insistence on social reality as a phenomenon sui generis is
partially to blame for this weakness. This emphasis played a crucial role in
circumscribing sociology as a separate disincline, but policing its borderlines
and fending off the encroachment from neighboring disciplines like biology,
physiology, psychology, and psychiatry had an unintended consequence of
delimiting the scope of sociological investigation and discouraging
interdisciplinary research. No doubt society informs the somatic-affective
phenomena, but its reach is powerfully checked by the corporeal and
neurological resources of the body that cannot be dramatized away and that
shape social dynamics according to the logic of their own. When psychic
events come to our attention, we should not assume that they are necessarily
psycho-logical. By the same token, social phenomena are not automatically
and exclusively socio-logical. The bio-social continuum calls for an analysis
that undermines the bureaucratic imperative of adhering to the disciplinary
logic sui generis.
Very very important and a next big need for advances in understanding, the
interaction of these factors. I see it a lot of this in work on surveillance
technology, with the silly battles between techno and social
determinists. There is some useful work in the social studies of science that
tries to integrate. In writing about the engineering of control it also is
present. The physical and natural worlds (beyond the bio) need more
presence in social understanding. Your example of the distended male
member works well (although I would have written erection instead) and no
amount of presentational aplomb will alter the different starting points for
most males and females, to stay nothing of the powers of gravity!
The whole division into social sciences and corresponding academic
departments must be problematized. Each field proceeds on certain disciplineconstituting assumptions and operations that the practitioners use to abstract
from practical manifold – the buzzing confusion of experience, as James put
it. The result is the compartmentalization of social sciences, each one staking
claims on a particular “reality” and vigorously policing its borders. Yet there is
no socio-logical reality that is not at the same time psycho-logical, no psychological phenomena free from the imprint of politics, no political events devoid
of economic influence, and so on. The bureaucratic logic sui generis favors

splitting the humpty-dumpty into as many academically certified fields and
pieces as possible. I am looking for the interdisciplinary logic that brings the
humpty-dumpty together again.

